Supreme Court Clarifies Contributory Copyright Liability Standard for Service Providers
On March 25, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment,[1] reversing the Fourth Circuit’s finding of contributory copyright liability. This ruling clarifies the standard for when service providers can be held liable for copyright infringement.
The Supreme Court held that a service provider is contributorily liable for a user’s infringement only when itintendsthat its service be used for infringement, and that such intent can be shown only in two circumstances: (1) where the provider induces infringement, or (2) where the service is tailored to infringing uses. Mere knowledge that users are infringing, standing alone, is not enough.
This decision confirms a narrower scope of secondary copyright liability for service providers than had been adopted by some courts and thus aligns lower courts around a clearer, intent-based framework.
Case Background
Sony Music Entertainment and other major music copyright owners brought claims of copyright infringement against internet service provider (ISP) Cox Communications, alleging that individual users were using Cox’s services to conduct widespread copyright infringement of their protected musical works. Over a two-year period, the copyright owners tracked peer-to-peer sharing of copyrighted music and sent Cox more than 160,000 infringement notifications identifying Cox subscriber IP addresses allegedly involved in unauthorized downloads.
However, an IP address does not readily identify the actual infringing party, especially in instances where many individuals may share the same IP address, such as with students on college campuses. In part given the scale and difficulty in identifying individual infringers, the copyright owners did not sue the individual users but instead alleged that Cox knowingly provided internet access to subscribers associated with repeated infringement, and so was itself liable for secondary copyright infringement.
During trial in the Eastern District of Virginia, a jury found Cox liable for both contributory and vicarious infringement and awarded approximately $1 billion in statutory damages.[2] On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the contributory liability finding and held that supplying a product or service with knowledge that the recipient will use it to infringe copyrights can constitute contributory infringement.[3]
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Fourth Circuit’s holding was consistent with existing copyright precedent.
Contributory Liability After Sony and Grokster
The Copyright Act does not expressly provide for secondary liability. Instead, courts recognize doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability derived from common law. In prior Supreme Court decisions—most notably Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios[4] (where copyright owners sued the maker and retailers of the Betamax video tape recorder) and MGM Studios v. Grokster[5] (where file-sharing software companies allegedly promoted and marketed their software to infringe copyrights)—the Supreme Court addressed the circumstances under which providers of products or services used by others may face copyright liability.
Those cases recognized two principal bases for contributory liability: (1) inducement, where the service provider actively encourages or promotes infringement; and (2) the provision of a product or service designed primarily for infringing uses, i.e., incapable of substantial noninfringing uses.
Despite those precedents, lower courts developed different formulations of contributory liability. For example, the Fourth Circuit, including in its decision in the Cox case, allowed liability where a defendant continued providing a service with knowledge that users were infringing. In the Ninth Circuit, in contrast, liability often turned on whether a provider "materially contributed" to infringement. In the online and Internet service provider context, this meant that a provider could be liable if it had knowledge of specific infringing material and failed to take "simple measures" to prevent further infringement. Lower courts thus struggled in the wake of Grokster to apply a consistent standard for contributory liability.
The Supreme Court’s Decision
In a unanimous decision, Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, affirmed that intent is the defining feature of contributory copyright liability. According to the Court, a service provider is liable only if it intended that its service be used for infringement. The Court held that intent may be established “only if the party induced the infringement or the provided service is tailored to that infringement,”[6] thus providing two avenues for proving contributory infringement:
Inducement of Infringement, where a defendant “actively encourages infringement through specific acts;”[7] or
Provision of a Service Tailored to Infringement,where the product or service is “not capable of ‘substantial’ or ‘commercially significant’ noninfringing uses.”[8]
The Court also concluded that this standard is not inconsistent with the DMCA’s safe-harbor provisions, as the DMCA creates defenses from liability but does not expand the underlying scope of contributory infringement.
Under the Court’s framework, mere knowledge that a service is used to infringe is insufficient to meet either option, and the Court concluded that Cox could not be held contributorily liable under either standard. Cox provided users with general internet access—a service with obvious and substantial lawful uses—and there was no evidence that Cox promoted or encouraged infringement using this service. The Fourth Circuit, the Court explained, improperly expanded contributory liability beyond the boundaries established in Sony and Grokster.
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Jackson, concurred in the judgment but criticized the majority for limiting secondary liability too rigidly. The concurrence argued that the Court’s precedents did not foreclose other common-law theories of liability (such as aiding-and-abetting liability) and that courts should remain open to those doctrines in appropriate cases. Nonetheless, the concurrence agreed that Cox could not be held liable on the facts presented because the evidence did not show the required intent to assist infringement.
Conclusion and Key Takeaways
This decision is the Supreme Court’s most important clarification of contributory copyright liability in two decades. It clarifies that contributory copyright liability cannot be based solely on a service provider’s knowledge that infringement occurs on its service. Rather, copyright plaintiffs must show that the defendant intended to facilitate infringement, either through inducement or tailoring the service to infringement. Accordingly, companies that provide otherwise lawful services, including internet service providers and online platforms, will generally face a lower risk of contributory liability, absent evidence of inducement or design features aimed at facilitating infringement. By emphasizing intent and rejecting liability based solely on knowledge of infringement, the Court has confirmed significantly narrower circumstances under which service providers may be held liable for the infringing conduct of their users.
Ciara McHale is a trial and appellate attorney representing companies in copyright, trademark, and other intellectual property and business disputes. She writes about legal developments affecting digital media, internet platforms, and emerging technologies.
Jonathan Downing is an attorney advising companies on copyright, privacy, and other intellectual property issues in the video game industry. He writes about legal developments affecting games, digital media, and emerging technologies.
***
[1] Cox Comms., Inc. v. Sony Music Ent., No. 24-171, 607 U.S. ____ (2026), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-171_bq7d.pdf.
[2] Sony Music Ent. v. Cox Comms., Inc., 464 F.Supp.3d 795 (E.D. Va. 2020).
[3] Sony Music Ent. v. Cox Comms., Inc., 93 F.4th 222 (4th Cir. 2024).
[4] Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
[5] Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
[6] Cox Comms., Inc. v. Sony Music Ent., No. 24-171, 607 U.S. ____, slip. op. at 7 (2026).
[7] Id.
[8] Id.